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Abstract  
We investigate the question of who ultimately pays and who gains from upgrading the power 
network to facilitate the roll out of EVs required, for example, under ambitious targets set by 
the Scottish and UK Governments. We use a multi-sector computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model for the UK economy to consider a network upgrade and EV penetration 
scenario for the period to 2030. We find that investment to enable network upgrades results in 
net negative impacts on real income available for spending across all UK households. This is 
due to the impact of time-limited large-scale investment on economic activity and consumer 
prices in the presence of capacity constraints, exacerbated by costs being passed on to 
electricity consumers through higher bills. But the lowest income households ± the group of 
greatest concern to policymakers ± are impacted least and initially enjoy small net gains 
under some scenarios. Moreover, the EV uptake delivers sufficient gains to deliver net 
positive impacts on all household incomes, with sustained expansion in GDP and 
employment across the economy. The key driver is a greater reliance on UK supply chains 
with the shift away from more import-intensive petrol and diesel fuelled vehicles towards 
electric ones.  
 
Keywords: Electric Vehicles; Electricity Network; Computable General Equilibrium; 
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Highlights: 
x Exploiting domestic (UK) capacity and supply chains in fuelling of electric vehicles 
x Shift to EVs can unlock, sustain and increase value in different parts of the economy 
x Technology and cost considerations need to be set in context of economy-wide benefits 
x EVs and other low carbon initiatives can deliver economic/industry policy outcomes 
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1. Introduction 
The UK and Scottish Governments have set ambitious targets for the roll-out of electric 
vehicles (EVs) by 2040 and 2032 (DEFRA 2017; Scottish Government (2017).1 These targets 
have been driven by the global recognition that EVs are a viable alternative to traditional 
fossil fuels vehicles and a key low carbon solution and technology for supporting the 
transition to the decarbonisation of transportation (European Commission 2014, IEA, 2017). 
Moreover, with the Paris Declaration on Electro-mobility and climate change aiming to 
increase electro-mobility to levels compatible with a less than 2°C pathways (United Nations, 
2015), advancing electrification of transport is a stated priority for most countries. Electric 
Vehicles Initiative (EVI) member countries have taken renowned lead in this respect. For 
instance, Norway set national targets of new vehicles to emit on average 85g CO2/km by 
2020 (Norway Government, 2014 ).Germany plans to roll-out at least 1million electric and 
plug-in hybrid vehicles by 2020 as declared in the national electro mobility development plan 
(German Federal Government, 2009).In the UK, efforts to further shift demand away from 
vehicles fuelled with petrol and diesel, the Government has set a target of at least 50% of new 
vehicles to be ultra-low emission by 2030 in the recently launched  µ5oad to Zero Strategy 
(HM Government, 2018; Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2018).  
But, if the EV roll-out is to play its intended role in supporting national priority of reduction 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it must gain support from a broad stakeholder policy 
community. In the paper we argue that a crucial element of this is demonstrating that the EV 
roll-out can contribute to unlocking, sustaining and increasing value in different parts of the 
economy. Policy attention in the UK has been directed to economic gains, but to date with 
                                                          
1
 In May 2019 the Committee on Climate Change - an independent, statutory body established under the 
Climate Change Act 2008 to advise the UK national and devolved governments ± recommended that the UK 
target to end new sales of petrol and diesel vehicles by 2040 be brought forward so that CO2 emissions may be 
further reduced by 2050. The Committee on Climate Change (2019) advice is set in the context of more 
DPELWLRXVµQHW]HUR¶WDUJHWVLQOLQHZLWKWKHORZHUGHJUHHV&HOVLXVDLPVVHWRXWLQWKH3Dris Agreement.    
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focus mainly on the wider economy returns of locating the manufacture of vehicles and 
EDWWHULHVµDWKRPH¶2XUSURSRVLWLRQis that a more straightforward source of wider economy 
value will result from EVs being fuelled by the domestic electricity industry, which, certainly 
in the UK, has a very strong domestic supply chain. We have previously argued this in a 
simpler economy-wide input-output (IO) multiplier framework (Turner et al., 2018). Here we 
extend using multi-sector economy-wide computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis to 
consider a fuller range of investment activities and market responses, which drive a range of 
distributional effects through income and price effects.  
Like any transformative low carbon solution and technology, EVs presents a variety of 
challenges for the vehicles industry, fuel station operators, electricity network and the 
government. In particular, the EVs roll-out will have profound impact on the electricity 
system that will require upgrade to the electricity network itself, which will carry significant 
costs that are ultimately paid by consumers. Here we consider how consumers may be 
impacted both through energy bills and the costs of other goods and services (where 
electricity prices impact production costs). In the first instance, we investigate how the large-
scale upfront but time-limited investment in electricity network infrastructure to support the 
EV-roll out could cause price increases and negative wider impacts across a constrained 
economy, where particular policy concern may lie with impacts on low income households 
(Ofgem, 2018). But our second question concerns the extent to which benefits triggered by 
the shift to domestically fuelled (and increasingly more efficient) EVs may offset this and 
deliver net wider economy gains, albeit with further distributional impacts (e.g. on 
petrol/diesel suppliers). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a synopsis of the 
existing and emerging discourse and debate around EV roll-out. In Section 3, we set out the 
core principles adopted in investigating the question of who pays and who benefits from the 
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upgrade of the UK electricity network infrastructure and associated EV roll-out. Section 4 
then details the CGE model specification and characteristics. It includes description of the 
UK dataset on which the model is calibrated and the simulation strategy adopted, which 
involves drawing on results of scenario analysis in an energy system (UK TIMES) model to 
inform on EV uptake, investment requirements and gains in vehicle efficiency.  Section 5 
presents and discusses the results. Finally, in Section 6 we offer our conclusions and thoughts 
on policy implications and future research needs.  
2. Background to questions around EVs in the literature 
Several studies have applied various models to estimate the implication and impacts of the 
roll-out of EVs. Some have largely focussed on the factors promoting and driving the shift to 
EVs, charging infrastructure requirements, and demand and/or consumer choice and 
behaviour of switching to alternative fuel vehicles (Jacobson and Delucchi, 2011; Miesel and 
Merfled, 2018; Noel et al., 2017).  
Other studies assess the potential economic cost and benefits of the roll-out and potential 
market penetration of EVs (Carlsson and Johansson-Stenman 2003; Noel and McCormack, 
2015; Schmelzer and Miess M., 2015, Villar et al., 2013). Studies considering consumer 
preferences and attitudes to the purchases of EVs have used survey and experimental choice 
methods to assess consumers perspectives and reactions on willingness to switch and pay for 
EVs, and their  charging preferences  (i.e. at home or at more centralised locations) (Dagsvik 
et.al. 2002; Glerum et al., 2013; Green et al.,2014; Noel et. al., 2019). Fernandez et al. (2011) 
focus on the impacts of different levels of plug in EVs penetration on distribution network 
investment, evaluation of network reinforcement and incremental energy losses. Lopes et al. 
(2011) evaluates the integration of EVs in the electric system and the grid control architecture 
and mechanism required. Another strand of the literature focus on the environment impact 
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and technical progress associated with EVs (Cames and Helmers, 2013; Choma and Uyaya, 
2017; Neves et al., 2018) 
Some authors highlight the need for active government support to incentivise and accelerate 
large-scale transition to EVs. These studies focus on using a combination of new and possibly 
innovative policy interventions and instruments, generally taxation and subsidies (e.g. 
Adderly et al., 2018; Lopez-Behar et al., 2019; Wang et al.,2018). On the other hand, there 
may be a gap in the literature in this regard, given the attention that policymakers and 
regulators have been giving to both developing and implementing mechanisms that protect 
consumers against higher electricity bills (which in turn impacts income and spending) and 
different charging regimes and infrastructure (Ofgem, 2018). Due to differences in electricity 
mix and national strategy the regulatory framework in other countries go beyond consumer 
protection to focus on wide economic protection in terms of maintaining jobs, export as well 
as protecting national wealth and growth (FMEEA, 2018) 
In terms of methodological approaches, most existing EV studies employ bottom up models 
(e.g. optimization, statistical methods and simulation models) to consider the potential 
economic and technological implications of EV uptake (Gnann and Plotz 2015). These type 
of modelling frameworks are frequently used to analyse the impacts of integrating EVs with 
the electricity system/network, grid control design, type of charging infrastructure and 
vehicle efficiency to support EVs uptake and market penetration (see for example de Rubens 
2019; Link et al., 2012; Richardson, 2013; Tran et al, 2013). This is important as bottom up 
models and methods have a key role to play in developing wider evidence base to enable a 
detailed understanding the potential impacts of what are expected to be large-scale shifts 
towards electric vehicles in many countries. On the other hand, bottom up approaches are 
more limited in terms of insights on a fuller range of indirect and economy-wide benefits that 
are of concern to the wider policy stakeholder community (Turner et al. 2018). 
8 
 
There are a number of studies that employ top down models in investigating issues around 
EVs roll-out (see, for example, Figus et al., 2018, Hirte and Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Li et al., 
2017). In many of these studies, there is a common consensus that the roll-out of EVs will 
have both positive and negative impacts on both the wider economy and vehicle users 
(Lemoine et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2019; Villar et al., 2013). Some of the positives impacts 
include; reducing vehicle operating cost, support to national and global CO2 emission 
reduction objectives and improved air quality, stability and sustainable of the electricity 
system (Noel and McCormack, 2014). On the other hand, the market barriers and 
disadvantages include; high prices, short drive ranges, long recharging times, and an 
insufficient recharging infrastructure (Berkeley et al., 2018; 2¶1HLO et al., 2019; Steinhilber 
et al., 2013; Vassileva and Campillo 2017) 
In this paper we argue that to accurately evaluate the wider economy and individual 
consumer impacts (both cost and benefits) of the shift from petrol/diesel cars to EVs requires 
focussing in the first instance on the core issue of who ultimately pays for the upgrade and 
improvement of the electricity network infrastructure electricity network infrastructure. 
2. Addressing WKHTXHVWLRQRIµZKRSD\V¶, and µwho JDLQV¶  
We begin by looking at how households and commercial consumers respond to the changes 
in costs of using an upgraded electricity system, and how this impacts prices and incomes 
across the UK economy. Moreover, the distribution of the benefits of switching to EVs may 
shift over time. The new transport services2 enabled by electricity network upgrades may not 
be enjoyed by many current system users, e.g. people who are not in the first wave of EV 
users.  Crucially, we adopt four underpinning principles in assessing µZKRXOWLPDWHO\SD\V¶
for the network upgrade required for EVs: 
                                                          
2
 We consider transport services provided through the uptake of EVs as potentially being provided with 
gradually reducing transport running costs as the efficiency of EVs increases, both relative to petrol/diesel in 
monetary cost per mile/km driven, and in absolute terms. 
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1. To fund the necessary investment, all costs are passed on to all current consumers 
through their electricity bills. The cost can be recovered over a relatively long (multi-
year) time period. Although they may ultimately be recovered more directly from EV 
users as uptake increases, we assume that recovery of the total investment costs is 
spread evenly over the lifetime of the assets created by the investment and reclaimed 
through bills.  
2. Commercial customers are likely to pass on their increased costs through their own 
output prices. Ultimately this will ripple through to domestic consumers in prices of 
other goods and services. Where firms export their output, the impact on UK 
households may be less direct, through the employment and income effects of any 
loss in competitiveness.  
3. Where capacity constraints exist across the economy, the process of upgrading the 
UK electricity network infrastructure through large scale investment could trigger 
further price increases and negative wider economy impacts as the sectors involved 
draw in additional (but scarce) labour and capital resources. This will be exacerbated 
where forward-looking producers anticipate the conclusion of a time limited spending 
programme, particularly where large-scale spending is concentrated within a 
relatively short timeframe. In the applied case considered here, direct investment 
spending within the UK is focussed in the Construction sector, with other investment 
spending (equipment needs) made overseas. Thus, any disruption ± and gains ± are 
associated with a domestic investment spend that is lower than what has to be paid 
back by consumers through higher bills.  
4. On the other hand, the uptake of EVs could trigger a stream of benefits. Based on the 
findings of our previous work (Turner et al., 2018), in the UK case we hypothesise 
that a key source of benefits is likely to be economic expansion triggered by a shift in 
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demand away from petrol/diesel (which has an import-intensive supply chain) 
towards electricity in fuelling vehicles. Our previous work demonstrated that 
increased reliance on the relatively strong domestic supply chain of the UK electricity 
sector may constitute a more straightforward source of wider economic gain than the 
manufacture of electric vehicles and batteries. Moreover, where EVs are more 
efficient, in terms of the cost per mile driven, this may further trigger a demand-
driven stimulus as real incomes rise and purchasing power is freed up for spending on 
other goods and services.  
These basic principles are subject to practical complexity, particularly in terms of the 
timeframe over which the required network investment is carried out relative to the timing of 
the expected realisation of benefits through the EVs uptake. 
First, as noted above, if we assume that producers are forward looking3, in that they will 
recognise and anticipate when any large-scale investment is time limited to meet a particular 
requirement, this will influence both sectoral and market responses to that investment. Any 
major demand shock to the economy puts pressure on resources and prices. But if this is 
concentrated in a short timeframe (i.e. the investment boost is large but time-limited), the 
impact can be more disruptive as resources are first drawn away then released again, with the 
latter potentially triggering negative net impacts at sectoral and economy-wide levels. Where 
producers anticipate this, they will be less willing to reallocate resources, which will dampen 
the expansionary process while also pushing up prices.  
In the context of the UK electricity network investment required to support the projected EV 
roll-out to 2030, thHSRWHQWLDOIRUWKLVW\SHRIµFURZGLQJRXW¶raises questions as to how the 
investment required should spread in the period leading up to that time. On the one hand, the 
                                                          
3
 The impact of the reaction and response of forward-looking producers to investment decisions has been widely 
discussed in literature. The assumption of forward-looking consumers is also a key question of specification in 
the type CGE modelling approach adopted in this paper (see Lecca et al., 2013). 
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industry Regulator (Ofgem) may be cautious about creating new capacity too far ahead of the 
projected requirement in case that does not materialise, and/or it impacts the efficiency with 
which existing capacity is used. On the other, particularly if constraints on labour and/or 
capital accumulation relax over time, the disruptive impacts of the network investment on the 
wider economy are likely to be lessened if the spending and upgrade activity are spread over 
a longer timeframe in the lead up to 2030.4  
This leads us to a second point. By 2030 the expected UK EV penetration is only anticipated 
to be 20% (Calvillo and Turner, 2019; National Grid, 2018). It may then be argued that 
effective planning for a mass roll-out of EVs actually requires a continuous investment to 
meet desired penetration levels. Our sensitivity analysis (Section 6.3) considers how 
anticipation of further investment may impact supply-side responses to the initial phases of 
investment simulated here. However, there are questions as to how an ongoing programme of 
investment to support network upgrades would be planned for in practice. In the UK, network 
investment decisions are made on the basis of 5-year (previously 8-year) blocks which are 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµSULFHFRQWURO¶SHULRGV (Pearson and Watson, 2012; SPEN, 2018) ± which are 
different for transmission and distribution parts of the industry - and set in the context of 
initial delivery of outcomes/benefits within the same block of time.  A further complication is 
that supporting the EV uptake is not the only demand on the UK electricity network: 
investment may spread across different price control periods in order to consider wide 
electrification programmes and actions/options. 
These points combined provide an interesting motivation to focus on investigating the net 
costs and benefits of the roll-out of EVs to 2030 in the UK context. To consider the case of a 
µMXVWLQ¶WLPH scenario (to meet increase demand), we consider network investment to meet 
                                                          
4
 This type of issue may form part of the concern expressed by the Committee on Climate Change (2019, p.182), 
ZKHUHLWLVQRWHGWKDW³«QHWZRUNVZLOOQHHGWREHXSJUDGHGLQDWLPHO\PDQQHUDQGIXWXUH-proofed to limit costs 
DQGHQDEOHUDSLGXSWDNHRIHOHFWULFYHKLFOHVDQGKHDWSXPSV¶¶ 
12 
 
projected 20% EV penetration by 2030 first in terms of spending and upgrade activity spread 
over 3 years (2027-2029, assumed to fall within a single price control period), then over 12 
years (2021-2032, cutting across at least two price control periods). In doing so we consider 
three research questions, which reflect policy concerns in the UK: 
i. How are the costs of electricity network investment and payback alone likely to 
impact low income households? 
ii. How do network investment and the EV roll-out combine to impact the wider 
economy adjustment?  
iii. What sectors of the economy gain the most and which lose out over different time 
frames?   
In the analysis we do not extend to consider a wider set of questions, such as how tax 
revenues from fuelling vehicles may be impacted by a switch to electric fuelling. This is 
largely because no specific scenarios have been identified in UK policy or industry 
communities. We do flag this as a crucial focus for future research in Section 6. Our next 
step, in Section 4, is to set out the modelling approach used to consider the issues and 
questions set out here.  
4. Method 
Using the UK-ENVI CGE model previously applied in Figus et al. (2017) to consider the 
impact of energy efficiency programmes on household income and the wider economy, we 
simulate the impact of an investment spend on upgrading the electricity network on 
electricity consumers and the economy. In the context of EV penetration and improvement in 
efficiency, we draw on a variant of UK-ENVI, developed in Figus et al. (2018) that focused 
on modelling the impact of technical change on private transportation and improvement in 
vehicle efficiency. Both variants of the model are calibrated on a 2010 SAM for the UK (the 
most recent year for which appropriate data are available). However, there are key 
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differences and changes in the structure of the model that relates to the specification of 
increasing investment demand in the current paper. In the following sections we outline the 
main features of the model, focussing particularly on the structure of household consumption, 
production and investment. 
4.1 Simulation requirements 
In the first instance, we focus on the investment stage to support the network upgrade to meet 
the projected EV roll-out to 2030. Our core focus is a mixed scenario ± informed by Calvillo 
and Turner¶VHQHUJ\V\VWHPVLPXODWLRQVWKDWLQFRrporate a National Grid (2018) 
scenario - that includes some extent of centralised and smart charging and for which a total 
investment value of £2.7billion is needed by 2030 to support 20% EV penetration by this 
time. The investment spending is spread across three or twelve years as outlined above.  
In consultation with one of the UK network operators (SP Energy Networks) we have 
determined that only one-third of the investment is likely to be spent in the UK, limited to 
activity in the domestic Construction sector. All other equipment required are imported from 
the rest of the world (ROW). Thus, while UK (commercial, public sector and household) 
consumers must repay the total investment value (£2.7billion) over 45 years for the life span 
of the asset, only £900million of total spend is made in the UK. Our primary focus under this 
scenario is the 20% of UK households on the lowest annual incomes, given that the main 
direct impacts of this group (least likely to be participants in the initial uptake of the EV roll-
out) may be expected to accrue mainly from the need for consumers to repay the investment 
cost. This is our Scenario 1.  
Our Scenario 2 involves adding and considering the impacts of the projected 20% EV roll-
out. This involves adopting UK-ENVI specifications introduced by Figus et al. (2018), with 
adjustment to permit the adoption of EVs by 2030 to be informed by exogenous data (outputs 
RI&DOYLOORDQG7XUQHU¶VHQHUJ\Vystem scenario analyses) on a 20% EV penetration by 
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2030 uptake and gradual boost in the efficiency of EVs in using electricity to deliver 
transport services (to 20% by 2030).  
The next section details the key elements of model specification required to model these two 
scenarios. 
4.2 Key elements of the model specification  
Figus et al. (2017, 2018) discuss in detail (in appendix) the fuller model specification of the 
UK-ENVI. Here we adopt the same broad configuration, in terms of national fixed labour 
supply, forward looking producer, myopic consumers and export demand. This section 
focuses on key elements of specification required to simulate the scenarios set out above.  
4.2.1 Consumption  
 
The multilevel consumption component of the model describes consumption decision of each 
representative household expressed in general form as  ܥ௧ ൌ  ௧ܻ െ ܵ௧ െ ܪܶܣܺ௧ െ ܥܶܣܺ௧ሺ ?ሻ 
Where C denotes total consumption, Y income, S savings, ܪܶܣܺ income tax and direct taxes 
of consumption, ܥܶܣܺ. t denotes time, which is considered to be one year (given that 
underlying data are annual). We assume that consumers are myopic5 and their intertemporal 
utility function is a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES), where at each node 
consumption decisions depend on relative prices and on the elasticity of substitution of this 
type 
ܥ௛ǡ௧ ൌ ൤ߜ௛ா൫ߛ௛ܧܥ௛ǡ௧൯ఌ೓షభఌ೓ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߜ௛ாሻܶܰܧܿ௛ǡ௧ఘ௘൨ ఌ೓ఌ೓షభ ሺ ?ሻ 
                                                          
5 This means consumer base their spending decisions mostly on current income available rather than on future 
discounted utility of consumption (see Lecca et al., 2013).  
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In equation (2)İLVWKHHODVWLFLW\RIsubstitution in consumption, which captures the degree to 
which consumers substitute energy goods. EC, non-energy and transport consumption, 
TNEC, įא (0,1) is the share parameter and ߛ,is the efficiency parameter of energy 
consumption. 
Figure 1. Structure of consumption 
 
Figure 1 represents the consumption structure in the UK-ENVI model. Each household 
allocates consumption between household energy (energy used for heating, lighting and other 
residential uses) and non-energy. Consumption of energy is a combination of electricity and 
gas. A key issue here is how the price of electricity is affected by the cost of investment being 
passed on to consumers. However, this applies to commercial users also, so we return to how 
this impact the model specification in Section 4.2.3. The main innovation in this paper is 
within the right-hand side of the consumption structure in Figure 2. In particular, the transport 
level and how EVs enter the model: EV uptake is introduced as an exogenous demand shock 
using Leontief Function where private transportation is split into electric vehicles and motor 
vehicles.  
Total 
consumption
Household 
energy
Electricity 
and Gas
Electricity Gas
Coal/Mining
Transport 
/non-energy
Transport
Motor 
vehicles 
Electric 
vehicles 
Non-energy
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ܧ ௧ܶ ൌ ܽ௧ா் ௧ܶ ௉೟೅௉೟ಶ೅                                                 (3) 
Where ETt represents electric transportation in any given year. In equation (3) electric 
transportation is determined as a share ܽ௧ா் of the total private transportation Tt. 
4.2.2 Production structure  
 
Figure 2 illustrates the production structure in each of the 30 sectors in the UK-ENVI 
framework. It reflects the classical KLEM nested CES production function, where the input 
decisions in each sector involve a CES relationships between inputs of intermediate goods, 
labour and capital. In each sector, intermediate inputs and value-added produce total output. 
Intermediate inputs are a combination of energy and non-energy. Capital and labour form 
value-added. Energy is divided into electricity and non-electricity. 
Here we assume that producers are forward looking and have perfect foresight. Capital stocks 
accumulate over time through investments. However, this is under circumstances where the 
foresighted producers anticipate that the funding for the network upgrade and reinforcement is 
transitory and no additional spending on network upgrading will follow.6 The investment 
decision follows Hayashi (1982), where maximization of the value of firms, ௧ܸ, is subject to a 
capital accumulation function ܭሶ௧ , so that 
Max     > @¦
f
 
0 11
1
t
tttt gI
r
ZS
 
subject to ܭሶ௧ ൌ ܫ௧ െ ߜܭ௧ (4) 
 
Where ߨ௧ denotes ILUPV¶ profits, ܫ௧ is private investment ݃ሺ߱௧ሻ is the adjustment cost function, 
with ݔ௧= ܫ௧/ ܭ௧ and ߜ is the depreciation rate. The solution of the problem gives the law of 
motion of the shadow price of capital ߣ௧ DQGWKHDGMXVWHG7RELQ¶VTWLPHSDWKRILQYHVWPHQW
(Hayashi, 1982) 
                                                          
6
 This assumption will be subjected to sensitivity analysis in the next stage of our research. 
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Figure 2. Production Structure  
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Labour market  
We assume that the labour market is characterised by a fixed national labour supply (albeit 
with a pool of unemployed labour as reported in the base year data given by the SAM) and 
that the nominal wage is fixed. The motivation for this assumption is that recent labour 
market conditions suggest that UK workers have not generally been in a position to 
effectively negotiate/bargain their wages in response to changing economic conditions.7 We 
model wage setting with fixed nominal wage, which is determined as follows: 
    ݓ௧=ݓ௧ୀ଴                                                            (5) 
where the nominal wage for the time period, ݓ௧ is constant and unchanging. 
                                                          
7
 This assumption will also be subject to sensitivity analysis in the next stage of our research.  
Total Output
Intermediate 
inputs
Energy
Electricity 
Non 
electricity
Non-Energy
Value added
Capital Labour
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4.2.4 Impact of network improvement on prices  
In the scenarios modelled in Section 5 the UK component of the network investment is 
introduced through an increase in exogenous final demand for construction sector output. 
However, the full cost of investment  spend (including the larger imported share) of the 
network upgrade to support the roll-out of EVs is passed on to the consumers/electricity users 
via higher electricity bills until the full investment cost is repaid. Thus, we outline how we 
have captured this increase in electricity price and electricity demand in equation (6): 
ܧܮܧ௛ǡ௧ ൌ ߜ௛௘௟௘ఘ೐೒  ? ൬ܲ݁݃௧݈ܲ݁݁௧൰ఘ೐೒  ?ܧܩ௛ǡ௧ (6) 
In (6), ELE is household demand for electricity, EG is the composite of electricity and gas, 
Pele and Peg are the prices of electricity and of the composite good electricity and gas, ߜ௛௘௟௘ is 
the share of electricity and ߩ௘௚  is the elasticity of substitution between electricity and gas. 
ܸܸ݈݁ ௝݁ǡ௧ ൌ ൬ܣாఘೕಶ൫ߜ௝௩௩௘௟௘൯  ?ܲ ܧ௧݈ܲ݁݁௧൰ ଵଵିఘೕಶ  ? ܸܸܧ௝ܰǡ௧ሺ ?ሻ  
Similarly, in (7) VVele is electricity demanded by each industry in the economy j, ܣா  is a 
productivity parameter, ߩ௝ா  is the elasticity of substitution between electricity and non-
electricity, PE is the price of the composite good energy, and VVEN is industrial demand of 
total energy. 
In the model the price of electricity is endogenous and is a function of all the other prices in 
the model.  Agents in the model pay the same price Pele as can be seen in equations (6) and 
(7). In order to increase the revenues from the sales of electricity and pay for the network 
upgrades, electricity supplying firms increase the price Pele and introduce a mark-up as 
follows: 
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௘ܲ௟௘ ൌ ௘ܲ௟௘௠௖  ? ሺ ? ൅ ߠሻ (8) 
Here ௘ܲ௟௘௠௖ is the price of energy in a perfectly competitive and equals the marginal cost of 
producing and supplying electricity, and ߠ is a mark-up.  The setting is similar to a simple 
monopolistic pricing model. The difference between the two prices gives us the marginal 
profit rate of the firm.  ݉݌ ൌ ௘ܲ௟௘ െ ௘ܲ௟௘௠௖ (9) 
If we multiply the marginal profit rate by the total revenue from selling electricity to firms 
and households (ܳ௘௟௘ሻ we have the total profit which is set exogenously and equals the 
expenditure necessary to reinforce the network (NTW).  
 ܹܰܶതതതതതതത ൌ ݉݌ሺ ௘ܲ௟௘  ? ௘ܳ௟௘ሻ (10) 
Here, NTW is exogenously determined and equals the expenditure necessary to upgrade the 
electricity network, ܳ௘௟௘ is determined by demand functions of households, firms and 
Government. When NTW is different from zero, the mark-up ߠ will increase by how much is 
necessary to get the marginal profit that is necessary to raise sufficient funding to pay for the 
network improvement. To simulate the increase in electricity price we substitute the price of 
electricity defined in equation (8) in (7) and (6) by setting NTW (9) equal to £2.7billion. 
However, we assume that while the expenditure takes place in 3 or 12 years, the repayment is 
spread across 45 years. In year 46, the price mark-up reduces to zero and the economy 
gradually approaches the long-run equilibrium.  
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5. Simulation results 
5.1 Summary of scenarios simulated 
As noted above, we simulate in two stages. Scenario 1 focuses only on the impacts of the 
investment spending on electricity network upgraded that is required to support 20% EV 
penetration across the UK private transportation fleet. That is, without the associated uptake 
of EVs actually taking place. As explained, above, we base the level of spending simulated 
on mixed charging scenario, which assumes that 60% of EV charging is decentralised so 
there is the need for more extensive distribution network, while 40% of charging is 
centralised and therefore the need for distribution network is limited. The scenario is 
informed by National Grid¶V (2018) µ)XWXUH(QHUJ\6FHQDULRV¶ with the £2.7billion 
investment required to support 20% EV roll-out by 2030 determined via an energy system 
(TIMES) model simulation reported in Calvillo and Turner (2019).  
Table 1. Breakdown of investment spending and repayment 
a b  c  d  E 
   (a/45 years) (0.33*a) (c/12 years) (c/3 years) 
Total investment 
Repayment 
 (per year) 
Total spending 
in the UK 
UK spend 
(per year) 
UK spend 
(per year) 
£2,700m £60m £900m £75m £300m 
 
As discussed in Section 3, the timeframe over which the spending on network upgrade takes 
place will affect the anticipated impacts of the investment spending. Thus, we set out two 
sub-scenarios, Scenario 1a and Scenario 1b. Scenario 1a assumes the spending takes place 
over the 12-year period between 2021 and 2032. Scenario 1b assumes that the entire spend 
and upgrade programme takes place within the 3-year period 2027-2029. In both cases, the 
total £2.7billion cost, £900million (£0.9billion) of which is spent domestically (in the UK 
Construction sector), is recovered via electricity bills across a 45-year period from the first 
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year of the investment (coincides with the life-span of the assets developed). See Table 1 for 
a summary of the breakdown and recovery of the investment spending. 
Scenario 2 ± where we have Scenario 2a and 2b incorporating the alternative investment 
timeframes in Scenario 1 ± then introduces consideration of how the roll-out of EVs affects 
the anticipated impacts. Here, we assume that there is a gradually increasing percentage of 
EVs is used to meet the private transportation needs, replacing the conventional internal 
combustion engine vehicles fuelled with petrol or diesel. The EV penetration is assumed to 
start at 2% in 2021 and expand by 2% each year until it reaches 20% in 2030. We also 
incorporate increasing efficiency in the EV fleet. This reflects conditions in the Calvillo and 
Turner (2019) analysis that we draw data from. By increasing efficiency we mean that by 
2030 EVs will be able to cover a 20% longer distance per unit of energy compared to what 
they can achieve now. We introduce this in step changes, where the efficiency of EVs 
improve, compared to present levels, by 11% in 2021, 16% by 2025 and 20% by 2030. 
 5.2. Scenario 1: Impact of £2.7billion spending on electricity network upgrade to 
support EVs roll-out on key macroeconomic variables, with £0.9billion spending in the 
UK Construction sector 
Table 2 summarises key macroeconomic impacts for Scenario 1. The first four numerical 
columns reporting for the case (Scenario 1a) where the network upgrade spending is spread 
across a 12-year period (2021-2032). We focus on 2021, the first year (short-run) impacts; 
2030, the year that the full 20% penetration is achieved; and 2040, ten years on. 2027 is 
introduced for purposes of comparison with the latter three columns, which report results for 
the case (Scenario 1b) where the network upgrade spending is spread across a 3-year period 
(2027-2029). All results in Table 1 are percentage changes relative to the base year (SAM 
2010) values. 
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Table 2. Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables from a £2.7billion investment 
spending to upgrade the UK electricity network   
 
  
Scenario 1a  
(12-year investment) 
Scenario 1b  
(3-year investment) 
2021 2027 2030 2040 2027 2030 2040 
GDP 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006 0.004 -0.014 -0.007 
CPI 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.013 0.005 
User cost of capital 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.035 0.006 0.002 
Unemployment Rate -0.013 -0.010 0.007 0.090 -0.146 0.140 0.094 
Employment 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.009 -0.009 -0.006 
 Import 0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.016 0.003 -0.004 
 Export -0.003 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.022 -0.007 
Electricity output -0.043 -0.062 -0.063 -0.067 -0.041 -0.073 -0.067 
Construction output 0.029 0.043 0.035 -0.009 0.111 0.002 -0.009 
All other output -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.015 -0.007 
Price of Electricity  0.084 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.088 0.107 0.104 
Marginal cost of electricity 0.012 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.015 0.035 0.032 
Real household spending -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 -0.013 -0.007 
 
 
The results show that WKHµGHPDQGVKRFN¶RIWKHELOOLRQVSHQGLQJLQWKH8.&RQVWUXFWLRQ
sector to enable the network upgrade, accompanied by the need to repay the 2.7billion (albeit 
over 45 years) causes some contraction in the economy from the outset. This is due to both 
the binding constraint on the labour supply (with only the pool of unemployed labour 
providing excess capacity), the short-term constraint on capital, and the fact that forward-
looking producers anticipate that the demand boost is time limited. The nominal wage is 
assumed fixed, but the user cost of capital is driven up as demand for the output of the 
Construction sector, and its upstream supply chain rise from the outset. This puts upward 
pressure on prices across the economy, as reflected in the CPI. Export demand contracts and 
there is a net decrease in output in all sectors except the Construction sector.  
23 
 
The biggest negative shock in Table 2 is reported for 2030 when the spending is condensed in 
a 3-year time frame ending in that year (Scenario 1b). Here, there is a contraction of 0.73% in 
Electricity sector and a further 0.15% in all other sectors but Construction. This is offset only 
very slightly in 2030 as resources begin to shift away from that sector in anticipation of the 
end of the spending programme. By 2040 the contraction eases, and more or less equalises 
over the two cases reported. Nonetheless (while it is not reported in Table 2), the cumulative 
loss to UK GDP within the 2021-2040 timeframe is notably larger (£1.33billion) when the 
spending is condensed in a 3-year period under Scenario 1b relative to that when it is spread 
over 12 years (£0.87billion).  
Our key focus, however, at this stage (prior to consideration of benefits emerging due the EV 
roll-out) is the impact on UK household incomes, and low-income consumers in particular. 
The results in Table 2 show that under either scenario household losses are generally 
proportionately greater than GDP losses. This is due to the fact that households have to 
directly repay a share of the investment through their energy bills (in addition to paying via 
the prices of other goods and services). The impact of the repayment is reflected in the fact 
that the increase in the price of electricity is notably larger than the increase in the marginal 
cost of electricity (which is impacted by the pressure that the expansion puts on the user cost 
of capital). It is only in the first year of the spending programme, and only under Scenario 1b, 
that the annual spend in Construction is sufficiently big to deliver gains to households 
(largely through direct and supply chain employment and wage income) to deliver a net 
positive impact on household real incomes, reflected in the  2027 result in Table 2.  This is 
small (0.003%) and in fact we find that gains are only realised in the lowest household 
income group (bottom quintile).   
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Figure 3. Net change in per household real income of £2.7bn network upgrade 
investment occurring between 2027 and 2029 
 
Figure 3 captures the net change in per household real income (take home wage) of the 20% 
of UK households with the lowest annual incomes that results from (i) the investment 
stimulus to the economy; (ii) the need to repay that investment. Here we see that, while worse 
IRUWKHHFRQRP\DVDZKLOHWKH8.¶VORZHVWLQFRPHKRXVHKROGVPD\DFWXDOO\H[SHULHQFH
minimal net short terms gains in 2027 (82 pence per household). But by the end of the 
investment period in 2030, this becomes a loss of 86 pence, compared to 30 pence in the 
same year if the investment is more spread out. Generally, we find UK households with 
higher incomes tend to lose more, both because of the greater absolute impact on what are 
higher energy bills overall, and the fact that they are more exposed to changing economic 
conditions. This may be expected given that wage and capital incomes are more important 
sources of income to better off households (Figus et al. 2017). 
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5.2 Scenario 2: Combined impact of £2.7billion spending on electricity network upgrade 
and 20% EV penetration by 2030 
For the second stage of our analysis, we focus on the realised impacts from the investment 
stage (as in Table 2) ± and the need to repay that investment - combined with the 20% EV 
roll-out being achieved by 2039. The combined impacts on key macroeconomic variables are 
shown in Table 3, the format of which corresponds to that of Table 2.  
The key feature to note in comparison to Table 2 is that introducing the EV roll-out enabled 
by the investment, generally results in a sustained positive impact on GDP, aggregate output 
(net across all sector) employment, and household incomes. This happens whether the 
investment is spread over 12 or 3 years, but with slightly stronger performance under the 
former case (albeit with the gap narrows between the cumulative GDP impact across the 
2021-2040 timeframe, with a £1.6billion real gain under the 12 year case and £1.56billion in 
the 3 year case.  
On the other hand, the bigger boost to domestic demands does put more pressure on the 
constrained system in the early periods, so that the increase in the CPI is generally around 
double in Scenarios 2a and 2b (Table 3) relative to what is reported for Scenarios 1a and 1b 
(Table 2). Thus, the decrease in export demand is notably larger in the earlier periods, where 
the investment activity is still taking place, and remains slightly larger through to 2040. It is 
the sustained boost in domestic demand through the roll-out of EVs that permits a sustained 
boost to GDP to be supported by a lasting boost to employment and household real incomes.  
In terms of what households consume, the results in Table 3 reflect the shift from petrol and 
diesel to electric fuelling, with an increase in household consumption of electricity, and 
continued drop in spending on the outputs of the refined fuel distribution sector. By 2030 
household consumption of electricity increase by 7.1%, while refined fuel consumption fall 
by 17% with the investment spread over 12-year or 3-year investment. 
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Table 3. Percentage change in key macroeconomic variables from a £2.7billion investment 
spending to upgrade the UK electricity network and the enabled 20% EV roll-out   
 
  
Scenario 2 (12 year investment) 
Scenario 2 (3 year 
investment) 
2021 2027 2030 2040 2027 2030 2040 
GDP 0.007 0.080 0.101 0.102 0.085 0.088 0.101 
CPI 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.008 0.014 0.020 0.008 
User cost of capital 0.027 0.011 0.010 0.005 0.042 0.012 0.005 
Unemployment Rate -0.202 -1.521 -1.967 -1.934 -1.657 -1.834 -1.930 
Employment 0.013 0.097 0.126 0.123 0.106 0.117 0.123 
 Import 0.032 0.016 -0.021 -0.030 0.029 -0.020 -0.029 
 Export -0.022 -0.020 -0.009 -0.008 -0.022 -0.023 -0.009 
Electricity output -0.092 1.955 2.992 3.055 1.976 2.983 3.054 
Construction output 0.083 0.165 0.151 0.103 0.233 0.118 0.103 
All other output 0.001 0.065 0.086 0.087 0.067 0.076 0.086 
Price of Electricity  0.083 0.121 0.138 0.111 0.105 0.141 0.112 
Marginal cost of electricity 0.012 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.015 0.035 0.032 
Real household spending 0.003 0.048 0.062 0.061 0.054 0.053 0.061 
Household consumption of electricity -0.189 4.546 7.065 7.079 4.560 7.059 7.079 
Household consumption of refined fuels 0.004 -10.582 -16.785 -16.810 -10.573 -16.792 -16.810 
All other household consumption 0.012 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.033 0.018 0.023 
 
Figure 4, plots the trend and impacts on key macroeconomic variables from the investment in 
network infrastructure upgrade and enabled 20% penetration roll-out of EVs for the case 
where the investment spending is spread over 12 years (Scenario 1a). Note that the increase 
in real household spending always trails GDP expansion. This is because, households 
continue to repay the network investment cost via higher energy bills, which is exacerbated 
by the fact that the uptake of EV increases demand for electricity, putting further upward 
pressure on prices.  
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Figure 4.  Net impacts on wider economy of 20% EV penetration by 2030 and required 
network investment (Scenario 2a) 
 
However, perhaps the key result driving the macroeconomic gains reported above, is what 
happens to the composition of activity in the UK economy. To illustrate this, Figure 5 
presents the percentage change in full time equivalent (FTE) employment across sectors in 
the UK economy for Scenario 2a. We focus on the impacts in four years of particular interest: 
2025, 2027 and 2030 (i.e. during the period up to the projected 20% penetration) and 2040, 
ten years on. Note that when we considered impacts beyond 2030 (and 2032, the end of 
investment activity), we are still only considering the impacts and economic adjustment in 
response to the initial phase network investment and EV roll-out to 2030.  
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Figure 5. Net impacts on sectoral employment of 20% EV penetration by 2030 and 
required network investment (Scenario 2b) 
 
Figure 5 reflects the fact that (in line with arguments resulting from the input-output analysis 
of Turner et al., 2018) the key driver of wider economy gains reported in Table 3 is the 
greater reliance on domestic (UK) supply chains in supporting fuelling of electric rather than 
petrol and diesel cars. In all periods, the greatest employment gains are enjoyed in the 
electricity sector itself and in public and private service sectors. The total gross employment 
gains, which are maximised in 2040 at 3,071 jobs, are set against a gross sustained loss of 
115 jobs in the same period. These job losses are confined to the manufacture and fuelling of 
petrol/diesel vehicles and offset in other sectors.  
The diversity and spread of the UK supply chain supporting the electricity sector are reflected 
in the finding that the biggest employment gains are in the wider public service sector, which 
includes research, education, health and other public services and gains a sustained increase 
of 874 jobs by 2040. The wider private services sectors, which includes everything from 
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finance/insurance to legal and real estate activities etc. ultimately gains and sustains an 
additional 430 jobs. The electricity (generation, supply and distribution) industry itself is 
more capital intensive, but still gains 512 jobs by 2040. This change in the composition of 
activity across industries with differing labour intensities is also reflected by the larger and 
sustained proportionate boost in employment over GDP in Figure 4. On the other hand, the 
contribution of the electricity to the expansion to the expansion in GDP is better reflected in 
Figure 7, which reports the impacts on sectoral gross value added (GVA) at sectoral level. 
Figure 6. Net impact on value of sectoral gross value added from 20% EV penetration 
by 2030 and required network investment (Scenario 2a) 
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6. Conclusions  
Generally, the analyses presented here serve to demonstrate the need to shift focus from the 
technology and investment concerns associated with large new low carbon initiatives to focus 
on how the new activity enabled may unlock, sustain and increase value in different parts of 
the economy. In the case of EVs, the results reported here raises questions as to whether we 
may have been missing a key source of value in terms of how we have fuelled our vehicles in 
the past. We have shown that a shift in household spending to fuel vehicles from more import 
intensive petrol and diesel towards the outputs of the electricity industry, which, in the UK at 
least, is a sector with stronger domestic supply chain linkages, will generate multiplier effects 
that allow the economy to expand. On the other hand, it is important to note that the 
expansion in UK GDP observed in our simulations is achieved at the cost of higher price 
levels and a drop in export demand for UK production.  
A key next stage of our research is to subject the results reported here to sensitivity analysis. 
In terms of the costs on the wider economy imposed by the investment stage to facilitate 
electricity network upgrade, a key starting point will be to consider what may happen if 
producers anticipate a continued programme of investment. That is, we have confined our 
attention to the EV roll-out to 2030, which maps to only a 20% penetration, while UK 
Government targets require a more extensive uptake of EVs over the extended period to 
2040. Similarly, network upgrade requirements and associated investment costs to 2030 and 
beyond will depend on just how smart and centralised the charging system can become. In 
terms of conditions in the economy, while the national labour supply constraint is a standard 
assumption (and an increasingly more relevant one as the UK exits the EU), our assumption 
of fixed nominal wages, while motivated by wage conditions in recent years, may be crucial 
in terms of just how the capacity coQVWUDLQWLPSDFWVWKHHFRQRP\¶VDELOLW\WRH[SDQG A next 
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step will be to consider the implications of workers having the ability to bargain changes in 
their real wage level as economic conditions change. 
But, at this stage, the initial results and analysis presented here allow us to draw a core 
policy-relevant conclusion. This is that UK policy makers and industry to consider to how to 
capitalise on the type of returns to low carbon development, how the timing of investment 
activity should be planned to maximise these, and how prevailing conditions in the wider 
economy may impact outcomes. Our results clearly show that, even in the presence of 
capacity constraints, the ongoing EV roll-out and other low carbon initiatives are likely to 
deliver greater gains where domestic capacity can be fully and effectively utilised, and that 
the process may not overly disadvantage low income households.  
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